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COMPUTING THE GROWTH RATE IN
PHYSICIAN PRACTICE REVENUE
The Most Common Mistake in Medical Practice Valuation’s Zero-Sum Game
By M ark O. D ie trich , CPA/ABV
Whether forecasting future cashflows
for a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
model or estimating terminal growth
for use in determ ining a capitaliza
tion rate, one of the m ost critical
judgments a valuation analyst makes
is deciding the growth rate in rev
enue and free cash flow to invested
capital or cash flow to equity. Overes
timating the growth rate is probably
the most common mistake in the val
uation of physician practices and
other healthcare entities dependent
upon the Resource Based Relative
Value Scale (RBRVS) and the Health
care Common Procedure Coding Sys
tem (HCPCS) including Current Pro
cedural Term inology (CPT).1 The
other entities include imaging cen
ters, laboratories, and certain diag
nostic facilities. In addition to physi
cians, physical and occu p atio n al
therapists, podiatrists, and chiroprac
tors are also included.
R evenue G row th consists, of
course, of at least two components:
growth in the number of units of ser
vices provided and growth in the price
per unit of service. A valuation analyst
should assess both of these in devel
oping a forecast. Number of units
depends upon the work capacity of
the providers (physicians, nurse prac

titioners, physician assistants, etc.) in
the practice, the dem and for their
services, competitors, the capacity of
the physical facility, and a host of
other factors. Price per unit in medi
cine, unlike many other areas of the
economy, is principally based upon
fees set by the government and third
party insurers such as HMOs and is
outside the control of the practice
and of consumers.2

PRICE PER UNIT
Generically, the Medicare program is
pro v id in g physicians with a fee
increase of 1.5% in 2005. This is a
result of specific legislation overturn
ing a scheduled decrease of 4.5%
based upon the statutory form ula
which determ ines the annual fee
change. It is important to understand
that the statutory formula is still in
place; the legislation only overturned
the result for 2005. Future cuts are
estimated at between 3.5% and 5.0%
per annum in the absence of further
legislation.
Fee increases are measured in the
Medicare Conversion Factor, which is
applied to the Relative Value Units
(RVUs)3 assigned to each procedure
or service performed by physicians.
M edicare fees p e r RVU have

1 CPT Codes are © the American Medical Association.
2 Exceptions include services not covered by insurance such as cosmetic plastic surgery or LASIK eye surgery.
3 RVUs in physician billing are analogous to hours in an accounting firm: the more RVUs performed, the higher
the fee. Unlike hourly billing rates, which can vary, the RVU rate is usually fixed. More complex work is assigned
a higher number of RVUs rather than a higher billing rate.
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increased only 3.3% in 7 years (see
figure 1 below). Although part of
this annual fee increase computation
involves a complex analysis of the
increases in physician practice costs
from inflation and other factors, the
key to u n d erstanding the annual
Update Adjustment Factor, is that it
is designed “to reflect success or fail
ure in meeting the expenditure target
that the law refers to as ‘allowed
e x p e n d itu re s .’” T hese allow ed
e x p e n d itu re s are an aggregate
amount (see table 1) equal to actual
e x p e n d itu re s in a base p e rio d
updated each year by the Sustainable
Growth Rate or SGR.
Table 1 shows the estimated pay
ments in $l,000s by Medicare to vari
ous physician specialties d u rin g
2005, along with the changes in the
aggregate RVUs for each of those
specialties. Reductions in RVUs indi
cate that the services provided by
those specialties have been devalued,
while increases indicate that services
have been revalued upwards. Basi
cally, ophthalm ologists pay m ore

Table 1: Medicare's Zero-Sum Game
Interventional radiology
Ophthalmology

Payments

RVU change

Dollars

191,000

3.00%

5,730

4,566,000

-1.00%

(45,660)

Pathology

846,000

2.00%

16,920

Vascular surgery

487,000

4.00%

19,480

Nurse practitioners

556,000

-1.00%

(5,560)

Physical & occupational therapy

998,000

-2.00%

(19,960)

Lab

452,000

6.00%

27,120

Diagnostic facilities

879,000

2.00%

17,580

Chiropractors

658,000

-1.00%

(6,580)

All others

5 6 ,1 7 0 ,000

-0.02%

(9,070)

Total

65,803,000

-0.00%

0

than $45 million out of their collec
tive pockets to subsidize increases in
payments to specialties such as inter
ventional radiology, pathology and
vascular surgery. Also on the losing
side of the zero-sum game are Physi
cal and Occupational Therapists.
Interventional radiology is a rela
tively new specialty in the world of

Figure 1: Medicare Conversion Factor

physician practices. Historically, radi
ologists “read films” and did not per
form procedures. Now, newly gradu
ated resid e n ts an d re -tra in e d
radiologists are performing increas
ingly complex procedures, some of
which require skills comparable to
those of surgeons. As new proce
d u res are developed, RVUs are
assigned to them. Because the over
all level of spending on physician
services by Medicare is set by formula
each year (as shown in table 1, the
allowance for 2005 is $65.8 billion)
as new procedures are added and
valued, old p ro c e d u re s m ust be
devalued!
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bursem ent as rep resen ted by the
Producer Price Index for physician
services has a com pound rate of
increase of 1.82% for the last nine
years with 1994 as the base year; the
annual rate has rem ained in the
vicinity of 2.0% th ro u g h o u t this
period. Physician practice costs tend
to go up by more than the rate of
inflation—a rate greater than 3%.
Thus, profit margins are under con
stant erosion.
This empirical data reflects the
general lack of negotiating clout in
the physician community due to the
large market shares held by major
HMOs in densely populated metro
politan market areas, where most of
the insured population resides. The
F ed eral T rad e C om m ission and
Department of Justice anti-trust divi
sions have intervened repeatedly
against physicians undertaking col
lective negotiating to counter the
monopolistic or oligopolistic power
of HMOs in these markets.
External evidence of annual fee
increases, such as those found in
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
C onsum er Price d a ta 4 or press
reports, will include the effect of the
so-called cost-shifting phenomenon.
This phenomenon causes the stated
charge for a particular service to be
significantly in excess of what is actu
ally paid for that service—unless you
happen to be uninsured. The unin
sured include the poor and those

CPA
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the charge per unit that is actually
paid.
The practice is budgeting for Year
2 and wants to increase physician
income by 3%. Since the practice is at
capacity, no additional units of ser
vices are expected to be provided.
Expenses are expected to increase by
3.5%, so that the revenue target for
Year 2 is $51,650, requiring a net
increase of 3.3% in fees. (See table 3.)
The process of setting the new
charge (which only self-pay patients
pay) requires knowing or forecasting
what increases will be received from
insurance companies. The previous
discussion indicated that Medicare
fees will increase5 by 1.5% and that
historically, h ealth insurers have

unable to obtain insurance, as well as
those who choose not to have health
insurance to avoid the cost, gam
bling they will not need the cover
age.

Table 2: Year 1 Revenue
Units

Charge
per unit

Medicare

400

100

Insurance Coverage

Payment Collection
per unit
rate
50.00

Net
Revenue

50.00%

20,000

HMOs

300

100

55.00

55.00%

16,500

Commercial insurers

200

100

60.00

60.00%

12,000

Self-pay (uninsured)

100

100

15.00

15.00%

1.500

1000

50,000

Expenses

30.000

Profit

20,000

A CASE IN POINT
The following example illustrates
how this phenom enon takes place.
In the initial year, a physician pro
vides 1,000 services to patients with a
stated charge of $100 for the service.
However, because of fees established
by Medicare and insurance compa
nies, the physician collects substan
tially less than the stated charge. The
payment per unit is net of contrac
tual allowances from Medicare and
insurance companies, and bad debts,
the latter representing patients who
do n o t pay and is lim ited in this
exam ple to the self-pay category.
The collection rate is the portion of

given increases averaging 2%. Com
m ercial insu rers are non-HM OS
which usually have smaller market
share and less negotiating leverage
and therefore can be expected to
give, on average, slightly b e tte r
increases than the HMOs. The antic
ipated charges are reflected in table
4, resulting in $49,550 of 2002 net
revenue. The rem aining $2,100 of
net revenue must be made up from
collections from uninsured patients.
Of these, only those who lack insur
ance by choice and who have finan
cial means are likely to pay a signifi
c a n t sum, an d the h isto rical
experience is that 15% of the self-pay

4 BLS does claim to attempt to adjust for this factor to get ‘real’ price increases.
5 On average, and for purposes of the example, assume this practice experiences the “average.”
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Table 3: Year 2 Targeted
Revenue
Target Profit
in 2002
103.00%

20,600

Expected
expenses

31,050

103.50%

Target net
revenue in
year 2

51,650

Net revenue
in year 1

50,000

Average
increase in
net fees

103.30%

category is collected. The result is
that gross charges must be $14,000
for the 15% collection ratio to result
in the needed revenue of $2,100,
and this requires a gross charge per
unit of service of $1,400, 40% higher
than Year 2001. (See table 4.)
Table 5 summarizes the result of
the calculations.
In a practice th at is at service
capacity, a relatively small increase in
operating expenses—3.5% in the
example—coupled with smaller per
centage increases from most of its
payors, must raise prices dramatically
to the uninsured to stay even. One
observation is that the “uninsured by
choice” who have economic means
are subsidizing the poor and indi
gent who cannot pay in any event, as
well as subsidizing the discounts
given to the Medicare program and
HMOs.
Among the many other implica
tions of the above example, a valua
tion analyst cannot rely upon a trend
in the charge for a service, he or she
must look at what is actually being
paid for that service. In valuing col
lectible accounts receivable, the ana
lyst cannot rely upon the am ount
shown in the receivables detail, but
has to analyze the receivables by
insurance category to d eterm ine
how much is likely to be collected.
Blindly “ballparking” a collectibility
factor without looking at historical

results and the age of the receivable
will simply not work.

profit, revenues are a weak indicator
at best of cash profits.

PAYOR MIX

GROWTH IN UNITS

A n o th e r im p lic a tio n —or, m ore
accurately, conclusion—is that the
financial success of a medical prac
tice or other healthcare provider is
irretrievably tied to the “payor mix”
or the underlying insurance cover
age (or lack thereof) of its patients.
The profit margin per dollar of rev
enue will vary wildly from insurer to
insurer and from market to market.
Physician incomes tend to be higher
in the South and lower in the North
east according to MGMA data—
although this can vary by specialty.
Given the facts of physician
income, use of the Market Approach6
based on revenues as a sole method

For the discrete forecast period asso
ciated with a DCF, the analyst may
find that the practice has the capac
ity to see additional patients or pro
vide additional services. The growth
rate during the years of the forecast
in units of service provided needs to
be evaluated carefully for reason
ableness. T able 6 h ighlights the
im p act of various grow th rate
assum ptions on the volum e of a
p ractice p rese n tly seeing 4,500
patient encounters per year (a typi
cal level for an Internal Medicine
practice).
With a growth rate of 4%, at the
end of the Year 3, the practice is see

Table 4: Calculation of Gross Charge
Year 2

Units

Payment
per unit 01

Payment
Increase per unit 02

Medicare

400

50.00

1.50%

50.75

20,300

HMOs

300

55.00

2.00%

56.10

16,830

Commercial insurers

200

60.00

3.50%

62.10

12,420

Self-pay

100

15.00

TBD

TBD

TBD

Expected Revenue

1000

49,550

Target 02 net revenue

51.650

Net revenue from self-pay 100

21

2,100

Expected collection rate

15.00%

Target Charges

14,000

Number of units

10

Target Charge per Unit

of determining value cannot possibly
yield an accurate result, as there is no
way to know how m uch in co m e /
cashflow those revenues generated—
and cash flow to capital or equity is
what hypothetical investors buy. Even
more suspect are so-called “goodwill”
values based upon practice revenues
m atched with so-called “goodwill”
percentages from the Goodwill Reg
istry. In an industry where payor mix
along with operating expenses drives

1,400

ing more than 5,000 patients. This
would be busy for an Internal Medi
cine practice and likely represents
capacity, unless additional providers
are added. If additional providers
are to be added, then the analyst
needs to consider the additional
expenses that the practice would
incur as well as the fact that prac
tices typically lose m oney as new
providers are added until they see
sufficient patients to cover addi-

6The Stark regulations defining Fair Market Value indicate that only transactions “in a particular market at the time of acquisition” are relevant!
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just under 2% to no more than 3%
for price per unit of service. Rates
larger than this require that the ana
lyst dem onstrate that the practice
has the ability to continue to add
capacity and patients into perpetuity.
Offering guidance as to a reason
able unit growth rate during a dis
crete forecast period for a specific
practice is very difficult because it
requires a careful analysis of the
p a rtic u la r situ atio n . Key to th at
analysis is assessing the capacity of
the physicians or other providers in
the practice to see more patients, as
well as the capacity of the existing
overhead structure to absorb more
patients.

Table 5: Year 2 Revenue
Year 2

Charge
per unit

Units

Payment
per unit

Net
Revenue

Medicare

400

140

50.75

20,300

HMOs

300

140

56.10

16,830

Commercial insurers

200

140

62.10

12,420

Self-pay

100

140

21.00

2,100
51,650

tional overhead as well as their own
compensation.
O bservation : O ne exam ple I
e n c o u n te re d d u rin g a review on
behalf of the acquirer of a valuation
prepared on behalf of the seller was
a projected 10% per annum growth
rate in the first three years of a five
year DCF for a primary care practice.
During my site visit, I noted that the

E xpert

location already had a serious park
ing problem—there were only seven
spaces and no potential for expan
sion.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above discussion, what
is the correct terminal growth rate
for determining a capitalization rate?
The reasonable range seems to be

M a rk O . D ietrich, C P A /A B V , is w ith D iet 
rich & W ilson, PC, Fram ingham, M assachu
s e tts .
He
can
be
c o n ta c te d
at
dietrich @ cpa.n et.

Table 6: The Impact of Various Growth Rate Assumptions
Base Year
Visits

4,5 0 0

Growth Rate

4.00%

1

2

3

4

5

4,680

4,867

5,062

5,264

5,475

5,470

5,743

7

8

5,694

5,922

6,159

6,030

6,332

6,649

6

Growth Rate

5.00%

4,725

4 ,961

5,209

Growth Rate

6.00%

4,770

5,056

5,360

5,681

6,022

6,383

6,766

7,172

Growth Rate

7.00%

4 ,815

5,152

5,513

5,899

6,311

6,753

7,226

7,732

Growth Rate

8.00%

4,860

5,249

5,669

6,122

6,612

7,141

7,712

8,329

8,226

8,967

8,769

9,646

Growth Rate

9.00%

4 ,905

5,346

5,828

6,352

6,924

7,547

Growth Rate

10.00%

4,950

5,445

5,990

6,588

7,247

7,972

FRAUD AWARENESS FOR VALUATION
PROFESSIONALS
By Robin E. T a ylor, C PA/ABV, CFE, CVA, CBA
Recent events have highlighted the
subject of financial statement fraud
in corporate America. Such notable
com panies as E nron, W orldCom,
an d H e a lth S o u th have received
almost constant publicity, but for the
wrong reasons: allegations of fraud.
Investors have suffered losses in the
billions. Consequently, increased
scrutiny has fallen on management,

the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and the accounting profes
sion. In addition, some confidence
has been lost in the United States’
financial markets.
Certainly, the risk associated with
operations of the enterprise and the
reliability of its financial statements
can have a profound impact on cor
porate valuation. Although much of

the recent publicity has focused on
large public companies, financial
statement fraud occurs in organiza
tions of all sizes. Additionally, the
fraud schemes used and the observ
able symptoms are similar regardless
of company size.
Even though a valuation assign
ment is not an “audit” of the subject
company or a formal fraud examina
tion, the valuation analyst should not
be blind to obvious signs of fraud.
The analyst should carefully consider
such signs and symptoms and com
municate their existence to the client
as is appropriate to the assignment
and our professional responsibilities

5
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as CPAs. I am not suggesting
an expansion of the engage
ment’s scope or a change in
its objectives, but increased
awareness of the signs of
fraud. Individual profession
als can then determine the
a p p ro p ria te response to
identified fraud risk factors.
The skill set of valuation
professionals is highly analyt
ical and well suited to spot
ting signs of fraud. Past stud
ies, however, have shown
that although CPAs are skill
ful in detecting these signs
and sym ptom s (such as
through the application of
analytical procedures), they
are often unskilled in inter
preting what they see. They
spot the symptoms but often
cannot diagnose the disease.

VALUATORS SHOULD CARE
ABOUT DETECTING FRAUD
A valuation engagement is a
consulting service, which by
definition does not involve
attestation services. It is not
designed to find fraud. We
com m unicate this fact to
clients and the report user,
protecting ourselves by our
engagement letter and the
limiting conditions disclosed
in our valuation reports.
Regardless of the engage
m en t’s purpose, however,
proper valuation often relies
on iden tify in g e x p e cte d
earnings capacity. Reported
financial information is ana
lyzed, inquiries and research
are perform ed, and then
the financial statements may
be adjusted to move from
reported earnings to n o r
malized earnings. Certainly
if the valu atio n analyst
believes that the reported
figures have been distorted
through fraudulent manipu
lation, adjustments may be
in order. This approach is

6
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A Fraud Detection Framework
The AICPA course “Identifying Fraudulent Financial Transactions” (a one-day
course) presents four steps for detecting fraud. I highly recommend this course to
those wishing to expand their skills in this area. The approach to fraud detection fol
lows a structured process. You first have to identify the organization’s fraud expo
sures. This involves reviewing both qualitative and quantitative factors related to man
agem ent and directors, the organization’s external relationships, its internal
organization, industry factors, and finally, its financial characteristics.
Identifying fraud exposures is very similar to the process of understanding the
company in the context of business valuation. In both, you are looking for critical risk
factors. The following are examples of potential fraud exposures:

MANAGEMENT
•
•
•
•

Criminal history of certain management members
High turnover of management positions
Performance-based pay systems
Autocratic management style

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS
• Related party transactions including large or unusual transactions and large trans
actions timed near the end of the year
• Unusual borrowing arrangements
• Significant receivables to payables

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
• New entity
• Overly complex structure

INDUSTRY FACTORS
• Declining industry
• Type of industry
• Company performance contrary to industry’s

FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
• Positive earnings but negative cash flow for extended periods
• Rapid growth
• Major account balances that are based on significant accounting estimates or com
plex accounting pronouncements
• Weak financial position
Next, you need to identify what fraud symptoms you would expect to see, given the
fraud exposure you have identified. You then search for those symptoms and, finally,
follow up on what you have observed. Such steps would be taken in a formal fraud
examination and, to a great extent, in a GAAS audit (compliance with SAS No. 99).
The process is also iterative, rather than linear. Information discovered at a later
“step” may cause you to reconsider earlier conclusions.
Again, one thing we do not want to do is cross over the line of converting a valua
tion engagement into something it was not designed to be. My caution here is that the
valuation professional should not turn a blind eye to such fraud exposures and fraud
symptoms when they are identified. The client at least should be informed of any trou
bling signs. Additionally, as indicated earlier, certain engagements may require more
emphasis on suspicions of understated or overstated financial performance. This
should be covered in the engagement letter for those specific assignments.

W in te r 2 0 0 5

no different from that used in adjust
ing h isto rical p e rfo rm a n c e for
unusual and nonrecurring items.
Several valuation issues we face in
such situations are:
• Obtaining knowledge of the fraud
and its amount (Was it reasonably
knowable?)
• Determining the am ount of the
fraud.
Occasionally, however, we will be
en g ag ed to p erfo rm services in
which the p o ten tia l presence of
fraud is a more direct concern in
determ ining financial fairness or
“equity.” Here, the appropriate stan
dard of value may be other than fair
m arket value. In such cases, the
assumption of possessing “reason
able knowledge of relevant facts” by
“hypothetical buyers and sellers” may
not be relevant. Examples of such
engagements may include:
• Assisting in due diligence and
pricing activities on acquisitions
• Fairness opinions
• Divorce valuations
• Damages quantification
• Minority oppression cases
Often the media focuses on situa
tions in which an earnings overstate
ment is alleged. In some of the situa
tions listed above, such as divorce,
the fraudster’s goal may be to under
state financial perform ance. Man
agement’s motivations and past ten
dencies must be examined.
Even in other types of engage
m ents, the CPA valuation profes
sional should not turn a blind eye to
the red flags associated with financial
statement fraud. Honing our analyti
cal skills in this area also increases
opportunities to obtain other types
of engagem ents in which we can
effectively serve the client’s interest.

TYPES OF FRAUD
T here are th ree m ajor classes of
fraud:
1. Financial reporting fraud: Fraud
against the users o f fin an cial
information
2. Asset misappropriation: Also known
as asset theft.

CPA

3. Corruption: This involves such mat
ters as bribery and kickbacks.
All three types of fraud can distort
the financial statements. There also
may be interplay of the fraud types
in an organization. For example, an
e n v iro n m e n t w herein financial
reporting fraud exists or is encour
aged from the top may, in tu rn ,
encourage employees at lower levels
of the organization to seek opportu
nities for asset misappropriation.
How does this happen? Manage
m en t th a t is actively engaged in
financial reporting fraud schemes
may be distracted from other inter
nal issues. This was alleged in the
case at MCI (pre WorldCom), where
the focus on increasing revenues at
almost any cost fostered a culture
that reduced emphasis on internal
controls and asset protection. As a
result, a mid-level employee was able
to defraud MCI and others of mil
lions of dollars.

FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD
For our purposes, this article will
focus on financial reporting fraud.
First, le t’s review some basic con
cepts. FASB Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No. 1 Objectives
ofFinancial Reporting by Business Enter
prises states: “Financial reporting is
not an end in itself but is intended
to provide information that is useful
in making business and economic deci
sions— for m aking reasoned choices
among alternative uses of scarce resources
in the conduct of business and eco
nomic activities.” [Emphasis added.]
Certainly, an in co rrec t financial
statement affects the user’s ability to
make reasoned choices.
Accounting misstatements can be
caused by error (the unintentional)
or fraud. We can make errors with
integrity, thank goodness! Fraud,
however, reflects a lack of personal
integrity. In either case, the financial
statements are less useful than they
should be.
According to a published study of
public company financial restate
m ents for 2003, the areas m ost

E xpert

involved in accounting m isstate
ments were:
• Reserves an d c o n tin g e n cie s
(17.5%)
• Revenue recognition (16.2%)
• Equity (15.7%)
• Capitalization of assets (10.1%)
• Inventory (5.7%)
Over the last five years, however,
revenue recognition has been the
leading problem area when fraud
was involved.

DEFINING FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD
Financial statem ent fraud involves
intentional actions, misstatements, or
omissions to hide or distort the real
financial condition of an entity to
deceive the users. There are no accidental
frauds!
The financial statement users, for
our purposes, are of two main types:
1. Those using published financials
as gauges of financial strength for
credit decisions, investment deci
sions, or internal m anagem ent
decisions.
2. Those using financial statements
as an analytical tool for valuation
assignments or fraud investiga
tions (assisting others in deter
mining courses of action).
Fraud can certainly be a material
valuation issue to users. For example,
a price/earnings (P/E) ratio of 10 to
1 mathematically means that an earn
ings o v erstatem en t (for reasons
unknown) could cause an overstate
ment of market capitalization equal
to 10 times the amount of the fraud
(net of tax implications). Obviously,
this “cold math” ignores many other
factors th at go into determ in in g
proper corporate valuations, but the
potential valuation impact is certainly
there. In addition, perceptions of
fraud in the marketplace can cause
investors to lose confidence even in
good com panies. T he perceived
added risk can lower market multi
ples and increase the demanded rate
of return.
T h at brings up an in terestin g
issue or two. Assume you have a valu
atio n assignm ent for a m inority
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interest in a closely held business in
which the price of equity was deter
mined using fraudulently prepared
financial statements that significantly
overstated net income. The presence
of the fraud was unknown and rea
sonably unknowable to the hypothet
ical buyer and seller. No adjustments
for the fraud were made. Would you
consider the value you determined
(based on earnings) to be reflective
of fair market value?
A similar issue could surface when
using market multiples from publicly
traded companies that had signifi
cant fraud issues as of your valuation
date. In hindsight, the financial per
formance of the public company was
obviously distorted because of the
fraud but the fraud was unknown to
the market as of your valuation date.
Is your valuation still reflective of fair
m arket value? Those knowing the
whole truth would have seen a differ
ent financial picture from that which
was observable and would have used
different market multiples.
Are additional valuation adjust
m ents to the m ark et m ultiples
appropriate in this case? Recently, I
posed this question to several top val
uation experts and the consensus
was that your conclusion was still at
fair market value because your con
clusion was based on w hat was
known or reasonably knowable to
the market participants as of the val
uation date. Do you agree?

THE CLASSIC FRAUD TRIANGLE
Frauds generally can be explained
with what is called the fraud triangle,
which has the following three “cor
ners:”
1. Need or pressure
2. Opportunity
3. Rationalization
How do these th re e “c o rn e rs”
relate to financial statement fraud?
The classic fraud triangle starts with
individual motivations, such as a per
ceived need by or external pressures
on the perpetrator. Greed is also a
strong m otivation. Pressures for
financial statement fraud include:

8
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• Meeting analysts’ expectations
• Increasing reported profits for
purposes of incentive-based com
pensation
• Covering management failures
• O b ta in in g fin a n c in g or m ore
favorable loan terms, or meeting
loan covenants
• Pressures from h ig h e r levels
within the organization exerted
th ro u g h fear, intim idation, or
threats of job loss.
Opportunity arises when the per
petrator believes the fraud scheme
can be successful an d n o t be
detected. Accounting systems may be
extremely complex, thereby allowing
the fraud to rem ain hidden. The
perpetrator believes the system itself
offers protection against discovery.
Alternatively, he or she exerts pres
sure downw ard on o th ers in the
o rg an iz atio n to hide the frau d
scheme or to not question account
ing or financial reporting decisions
mandated from “on high.”
Additionally, m anagem ent may
override internal controls. Sadly,
management may simply attempt to
fool or intimidate the auditors. For
exam ple, they may th re a te n the
auditors with loss of the client or loss
of other consulting engagements if
they question explanations or seek
adequate documentation.
Exam ples of o p p o rtu n itie s to
comm it financial statem ent fraud
include:
• Absence of proper oversights by
the Board of Directors
• Weak or nonexistent internal con
trols
• Override of internal controls
• A corporate culture that fosters
fraud (what is the ethical message
th a t com es from top m anage
ment?)
• Complex accounting rules
• Complex organizational structure
• Financial estimates requiring sig
nificant judgment.
Fraudsters have the ability to jus
tify their actions. They do not view
their acts as criminal, at least initially.
Rationalizations of financial state

ment fraud may include:
• “Everyone else is doing it.”
• “We’re doing it to protect share
holder value.”
• “It’s ju st a tim ing issue. Future
performance will cure the current
problem.”
• “It will never happen again.”
• “We’re protecting the jobs of our
people and this community.”
A situation in which all three ele
ments of the fraud triangle are pre
sent creates the greatest fraud expo
sure. For example, despite pressures
to commit the fraud, without fraud
opportunities, because internal con
trols are strong and the corporate
culture fosters integrity, fraud expo
sure is limited. The valuation analyst
can obtain knowledge of such quali
tative elements during management
interviews or the site visit.

INDUSTRY FACTORS
We also need to remember that cer
tain industries have historically been
more prone to fraudulent reporting.
One study of public companies, for
example, found that about 78% of
reported public company financial
statement frauds involved companies
listed on the NASDAQ. About 15%
were listed on the NYSE. Think of
the nature of many of the NASDAQ
companies: high-tech, telecommuni
cations, bio-tech, start-up companies,
and those experiencing rapid growth
and having a high need for capital to
fund growth. Such entities would nat
urally receive greater scrutiny.

SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT AREAS
Since we’re dealing with intent to
deceive, not accidental misstatements,
let’s review some of the strategies
th at continually account for the
majority of intentionally misleading
reporting practices:
• Reporting revenue (timing issues,
bogus sales)
• Boosting income with one-time
gains
• Shifting c u rren t expenses to a
later or earlier period (timing)
• Capitalization policies
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• Failing to disclose major liabili
ties—contingent or real
• D eferring c u rre n t profits and
using them to offset expected
future losses
A nother term used for some of
these actions is earnings management.
It has o ccu rred for h u n d re d s of
years. Management can make legiti
m ate decisions on tim ing, and
accounting allows the use of esti
mates in many areas, but not with the
intent to deceive the user.
Nothing is wrong with legitimate
“earnings management” techniques,
just as nothing is illegal in proper tax
planning (tax avoidance v. tax eva
sion). Sometimes, however, financial
statement fraud is hidden behind the
mask of “professional judgm ent” in
the application of accounting princi
ples, such as the timing of revenue
recognition. G enerally accepted
accounting principles have to be flexi
ble to allow for differing circum 
stances. Overly aggressive application
of accounting principles, however,
can be fraudulent when there is intent
to deceive users. Additionally, proving
there was such “intent” remains one
of the most difficult elements in win
ning a financial fraud case.

REVENUE FRAUD
As we know, revenue is often the sin
gle largest item on financial state
ments. For right or wrong, investors
weigh revenue very heavily in mak
ing decisions. The trend in revenue
growth is one of the most sensitive
factors in changes in the market cap
italization of a company, especially
high tech or “new economy” compa
nies. During the run up of “dot com”
stock prices, often no earnings were
reported. Thus, the focus shifted to
other valuation factors, including
revenue growth.
If rev en u e grow th is w hat
investors want to see, there is pres
sure to give it to them. One analyst
remarked, “The top line is the bot
tom line for many investors today.”
In spite of all of the sophisticated
accounting systems and complicated
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Major Red Flags
Regardless of the type of organization, the presence of certain red flags
should be considered in determining the potential of fraud. The following is
a partial list of these flags:
• Management places undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections
or other quantitative targets.
• The control environment within the company is weak.
• Management compensation depends on meeting unreasonable quanti
fied targets set by others.
• Operating and financial decisions are dominated by a single person or a
few persons.
• Management seems overly interested in complex accounting matters.
• An unusually high percentage of the booked assets are intangibles.
• Management and key accounting personnel turnover is high.
• The client’s profitability is inadequate or inconsistent relative to the
industry.
• There is a continuing large variance between cash flow and reported
earnings.
• The client is facing adverse legal or regulatory issues.
• Conditions in the client’s industry are not positive for the long term.
• The client participated in several end of year (or end of quarter) transac
tions that have a material effect on the financial statements. Alternatively,
there are pending transactions that are viewed as critical to success.
• The client is in a period of rapid growth.
• Client growth has been fueled by continuous acquisitions.
The presence of these symptoms does not necessarily indicate that fraud
exists. Their presence should, however, generate a heightened sense of
awareness of fraud potentials. Remember also the critical need to synthe
size all red flags observed during your review. Lifestyle and behavioral symp
toms, lack of controls, and lack of proper documentation must be consid
ered along with your analytical review of the numbers.
disclosures, many of the major fraud
schemes remain relatively simple in
their execution. Many involve simple
classification issues in the statement
of operations. These techniques do
not change the bottom line of the
company. The perpetrator, however,
knows that financial statement users
focus on different financial parame
ters in different industries. W hen
revenue growth is a key factor to
users, normal offsets to sales may be
moved down to other locations on
the statement of operations. Alterna
tively, large one-time gains from sales
of certain assets or business units
may be moved upward and classified
as operating revenue. The “geogra
phy” (location of presentation) has
simply been adjusted.
For example, sales returns may be
moved to cost of sales rather than

being netted against gross sales, pur
chase discounts may be moved to
operating revenue, or gains on sales
of assets are moved to operating rev
enue.
Other schemes may involve early
revenue recognition, where revenue
is booked before delivery, before
right of cancellation, or before trans
fer of title. Early revenue recognition
can be p erp etrated with bill-andhold schemes. One public company,
for example, used a bill-and-hold
strategy to inflate revenue by getting
retailers to agree, in exchange for a
discount, to purchase shipments of a
company product six months before
they were needed and allowing pay
m en t for them six m onths later.
A nother scheme involves booking
the revenue as earned when a side
agreem ent allows the custom er to
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return all unsold goods.
Fictitious sales comprise frequent
frauds related to revenue recogni
tion. Sales may be recorded to fake
customers or may involve fake trans
actions to legitimate customers who
have no agreement to purchase, no
knowledge of the transaction, and
no intent to pay.
One unique recognition method
we observed on a fraud case was that
of a sales manager. He recognized
the revenue on the sale of a unit
when he “knew in his heart” it was a
sale. I have yet to see this unique rev
en u e m eth o d in any recognized
accounting textbook.
So when is a sale a sale? Accord
ing to SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin
101 on Revenue Recognition, four
factors characterize a sale:
1. Persuasive evidence th a t an
arrangement exists.
2. Delivery has occurred or services
have been rendered.
3. Seller’s price is fixed and deter
minable.
4. C ollectibility is reasonably
assured.
These are “common sense” factors.
When commenting on the above SEC
bulletin, one accounting educator

th e KNOW

lamented the need now for the SEC
to promulgate the obvious.

EXPENSE FRAUD
Expense fraud is often perpetrated
though inventory overstatem ent,
capitalization of expenses, liability
omissions, and understating or over
stating reserves. W orldC om , for
example, is alleged to have inflated
earnings by counting routine operat
ing expenses im properly as long
term capital e x p e n d itu re s. This
fraud reached $11 billion.
An unusual growth in the balance
sheet or a changing asset mix in
comparison to industry benchmarks
can be symptomatic of fraud.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS
The tools of financial statem ent
analysis for the auditor, fraud exam
iner and the valuation professional
are similar. The level of follow up
and inquiry will, however, likely dif
fer. CPAs are familiar with the three
major types of tools to be used: verti
cal analysis, horizontal analysis, and
ratio analysis.
Both accounting accidents and
accounting fraud may generate the
need for financial statement adjust

By James R. H itchner, C PA/ABV, ASA

an even number of observations, you
take the m ean average of the two
m iddle num bers; that is the m id
point or median. The mode is the
n u m b e r th a t ap p ears m ost fre 
quently. Generally, in the valuation
world, only mean and median aver
ages are used.

Averages are often used in valuation
analyses. They are also often mis
used. Did you know that there are
three types of averages? There are
the m ean, the m ed ian and the
mode—what I call the “three M’s.”
The mean is the sum of the observa
tions divided by the n u m b e r of
observations. T he m edian is the
num ber in the middle that has as
many observations above as below.
This works just fine when you have
an odd number of observations. For

Now on to the real question. Should
you use a mean, median, or both?
W ell, it d e p e n d s. Some analysts
decide ahead of time to go with just
the mean or median. Others calcu
late both and then make a decision
as to which to rely upon. Of course,
this assum es th a t an average is
appropriate, which is not always the
case. Sometimes individual observa
tions are given more weight than an
average. Assum ing an average is

In

About when to use the mean,
median, or both

10

DECIDING WHICH TO USE

ments in performing a valuation. Both
types of situations (material error or
fraud) may also exhibit the same type
of analytical symptoms during finan
cial statem ent analysis. O ur focus,
however, is not on the accidental.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Fraud has always been with us and it
always will be. No amount of regula
tion or oversight will ever eliminate
it. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provi
sions and SAS No. 99 are welcomed
but will not put an end to financial
statement fraud in public or private
companies. Some people, given the
opportunity and desire, will always
b reak the rules an d a tte m p t to
“fleece the sheep.”
The issues of financial statement
fraud are many and can be complex.
Adding basic fraud awareness skills is
an effective way to increase the qual
ity of your valuation engagem ents
and can open up additional engage
ment opportunities.
Robin E. Taylor, C P A /A B V , CFE, CVA, CBA is
a partner in th e Birmingham, Alabama office
o f th e re g io n a l a c c o u n tin g fir m , D ixo n
Hughes PLLC. He is a co-author of Financial
Valuation: Applications and M odels (Hobo
ken, NJ: John W iley & Sons). He can be con
tacted a t rtaylor@dixon-hughes.com.

appropriate or desired, some ana
lysts will calculate both and compare
them. If they are close there is not
an issue. But what if they are differ
ent? Typically, if the m edian is
higher than the mean, there may be
outliers in the m ean calculation
causing a dow nw ard bias. If the
mean is higher, there may be out
liers causing an upward bias. Using a
median assists in reducing the effect
of outliers. That is why many analysts
prefer this type of average. Well,
th e re you have it—a sim ple b u t
im portant concept to consider in
preparing credible valuation conclu
sions.

James R. Hitchner, C P A /A B V , ASA, is with
th e F in a n c ia l V a lu a tio n G roup, A tla n ta ,
G eo rg ia. He can be c o n ta c te d a t jh itc h ner@ fvginternational.com .
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A FORMIDABLE
FOURSOME
Four ABV credential holders have been
honored by the AICPA. Among them, the
first woman to be inducted into the
AICPA BV Hall ofFame.
Four AICPA members were honored
at the AICPA National Business Valu
atio n C o n feren ce in O rlan d o ,
Florida, Novem ber 7-9, 2004. All
honorees are holders of the AICPA’s
A ccredited in Business Valuation
(ABV) credential.

sional firm management. In 2001, he
was inducted as a Fellow into the Col
lege of Law Practice Management.
He has been a
featured speaker
at AICPA confer
ences and at con
feren ces sp o n 
sored by the
National Associa
tion of Certified
V aluation A na
lysts, as well as
Ron Seigneur
state bar associa
tions, state CPA societies, and the
Environmental Protection Agency.

HALL OF FAME
VOLUNTEERS OF
THE YEAR
T he BV V olun
teer of the Year
Award recognizes
CPAs who have
advanced
the
ABV C redential
and business val
Harold M artin
uation profession
for CPAs through
their extraordinary service as a mem
ber of an AICPA com m ittee, sub
committee, or task force. This year,
H arold M artin and Ron Seigneur
were honored for their commitment
and service as Volunteers of the Year.
H aro ld M artin, CPA/ABV, ASA,
CFE, is a p rin c ip a l with K eiter,
Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves,
PC, Glen Allen, Virginia. He has
served as editor of the AICPA ABV EValuation Alert since its inception in
1999 and he is an editorial adviser to
CPA Expert. He is also a member of
the AICPA Task Force on valuation
of pass-through entities and of the
Appraisal Standards Board USPAP
Task Force.
Ron Seigneur, CPA/ABV, CVA, is
a partner with Seigneur Gustafson
Knight, LLP, Lakewood, Colorado.
He is recognized nationally as a con
sultant to law firms on valuation and
practice management issues and as
an instructor and author on business
valuation, leadership and profes

Induction into the BV Hall of Fame
recognizes CPAs whose lifetim e
achievements and
c o n trib u tio n s
have significantly
advanced
the
business valuation
discipline. This
year’s inductees
are Tom H ilton
and Eva Lang.
Tom
H ilton, Tom Hilton
CPA/ABV, ASA,
CVA, is a partner with Anders, Min
kler & Diehl LLP, St. Louis Missouri.
He is recent past chair of the AICPA
Business Valuation Committee and is
currently, a mem ber of the AICPA
Business Valuation, Forensic & Litiga
tion Services Executive Committee.
He has also been involved with
numerous boards and committees of
the AICPA and other organizations.
Eva Lang, CPA/ABV, ASA, is
executive director of the Financial
Consulting Group. She is the first
woman to be inducted into the BV
Hall of Fame. Ms.
Lang is a nation
ally reco g n ized
e x p e rt on ele c 
tro n ic research
for business valu
ation and litiga
tion support ser
vices. She speaks
fre q u e n tly
to
Eva Lang
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BV Standards and the New
BV/FLS Web Site
Proposed AICPA Business Valua
tio n S tan dards and th e new
B V /F L S com m unity W eb s ite
(www.aicpa.org/BVFLS) were among the
to p ic s covered a t th e AICPA
National Business Valuation Con
ference in Orlando, Florida, Novem
ber 7 -9 , 2004. A preliminary draft
of the proposed BV standards was
presented to and discussed with
the members in attendance. Mem
bers will be apprised of when the
standards are issued as a public
exposure draft for their comments.
The benefits and richness of the
new Web site were also discussed
and dem onstrated. But see for
yourself; go to www.oicpa.org/BVFLS.

national groups on technology issues
and is a contributing editor to CPA
Expert. She writes a “Web Site of the
Month” column for the AICPA ABV
E-Valuation Alert and she is a co
author of The Best Web sites for Finan
cial Professional published by John
Wiley & Sons (Hoboken, New Jer
sey). In a d d itio n , Ms. Lang has
served on the AICPA Business Valua
tion and Appraisal Subcommittee, as
well as CPA committees at the state
level in the areas of estate planning,
litigation services, and management
consulting services.

Upcoming ABV Exam
More than 100 practitioners took
the examination for the Accredited
in Business Valuation credential,
which was administered between
November 1 5 and 3 0 . The next
exam is scheduled for June 2 0 -2 5 ,
2 0 0 5 . Registration for the June
exam opened on December 1 and
will remain open until some time in
April. For more information, visit
w w w .aicpa.o rg/B V F LS /events. This s ite
offers access to information on the
ABV application process and the
ABV competency assessment tool,
as well as on the exam registration
process.
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with Interpretation 101-3.
If you have questions, issues, or
concerns not addressed at the site,
send an email to ethics@aicpa.org.

NEW GUIDANCE FOR
INTERPRETATION 101-3:
NONATTEST SERVICES

APPLICATION PROCESS
BEGINS FOR COMMITTEE
SERVICE

As of December 31, 2004, practition
ers will be required to document in
w riting the u n d erstan d in g estab
lished with the client under General
Requirement No. 3 of Interpretation
101-3, Nonattest Services. The AICPA
has continually updated its Web site
with new information for firms seek
ing clarification on how to comply.
Keep w atching the W eb site,
www.aicpa.org/members/div/ethics/intr_101-3.htm,
for a competency white paper and
representation and engagement let
ter examples, which are expected
soon. Both should greatly assist firms

May 1, 2005 is the deadlinefor applying

open until May 1, 2005. You can
apply online: Go to volunteers.aicpa.org to
complete a brief Web-based applica
tion. Address inquiries to David Ray
at 212-596-6030 or dray@aicpa.org.

Much to Our Regret

to serve during the next committee year
(October 2005-October 2006).

Because of a previous commitment
of Jim Hitchner, CPA Expert can

Members interested in contributing
to their profession and networking
with their peers have the opportu
nity to do so by applying to serve on
an AICPA committee or panel in the
n e x t co m m ittee year (O c to b e r
2005-October 2006). This year there
are several new committees and pan
els to choose. To avoid conflicts with
tax season, the application period is

versies,” which appeared in the
Fall 2004 issue.

not publish the succeeding parts of
his article, “Cost of Capital Contro

Although this is our loss, readers
can still gain the benefits of Jim’s
insights: The succeeding parts of
the article will appear in upcoming
issues of Shannon Pratt’s Business
Valuation Update.
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